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Abstract
Different theories of the origins of democracy propose that collective action by particular
urban social groups spur democratization. But, recent large-n studies on mass opposition move-
ments and democratization notwithstanding, systematic and direct large-n evidence on this is
missing. We further develop the argument that both industrial worker and urban middle class
movements are conducive to democratization, albeit for slightly different reasons. We thereafter
conduct the first large-n empirical study of its kind on this issue. To this end, we collect new
data on social composition of anti-regime opposition movements, globally, for 1900–2012. Re-
sults clearly show that movements dominated by one of the two urban groups are associated
with increased democratization prospects, both when compared to other movements and to sit-
uations without any organized mass opposition movement. We conduct various tests to assess
sensitivity to, e.g., measurement strategy, geographic and temporal scope, model specification,
and to accounting for the endogeneity of opposition campaigns. The relationship between in-
dustrial worker campaigns and democratization is particularly robust, but there is also evidence
that middle class campaigns matter. Further tests suggest that these campaigns, as expected,
relate more strongly to democratization in urban than in rural societies.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between the social profile of opposition movements and democratization has
received much theoretical attention from comparative social scientists of different stripes, and has
been scrutinized in numerous case- and small-n comparative studies (e.g., Moore, 1966; Luebbert,
1991; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992; Collier, 1999). A more recent large-n literature
also exists on mass opposition movements and democratization, but it focuses mainly on tactical
choices within these movement, their strategic interaction with the regime, and the macro-structural
conditions enabling them (e.g., Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Celestino Rivera and Gleditsch,
2013). Systematic large-n empirical studies that directly link the social composition of anti-regime
movements to regime outcomes, however, are missing. This leaves some question marks concerning
the generality of extant case-based evidence, as well as the direct relevance of large-n studies on
democratization employing distal proxies of the preferences and/or capacities of various social
groups, such as urbanization, GDP per capita or (land or income) inequality (e.g., Lipset, 1959;
Boix, 2003; Ansell and Samuels, 2014).
We further develop the argument that social class composition of mass opposition movements
affects democratization. More specifically, we propose that industrial workers and the urban middle
classes should – at least in fairly urban and industrialized (or even industrializing) societies – have
both the requisite motivation and the capacity for effectively bringing about democratic regime
change. Other social groups often lack either in capacity (e.g. peasants) or motivation (e.g. military
officers). To test this, we collect a novel dataset on the social composition of opposition movements,
and provide the first large-n study of its kind on consequences for democratization. Hence, we
introduce a new perspective to the emerging empirical literature on opposition movements against
autocracies, and provide fresh evidence bearing on some of the most widely celebrated theories in
the macro-comparative social science literature.
To be more specific, we collect data on presence and level of participation of 6 major social
groups in about 200 anti-regime opposition campaigns, as identified in the extant NAVCO dataset
(Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011), from 1900–2012. With these data, we first probe the more gen-
eral proposition that opposition movements constituted by social groups located in urban centers,
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and empowered by industrialization, are conducive to democratization. Second, we conduct tests
distinguishing between opposition movements dominated by industrial workers and by the urban
middle classes. We employ different relevant specifications and estimators to carefully assess ro-
bustness, and our analyses comprise both cross-section models at the opposition-campaign level and
cross-section time-series models. The latter not only enable us to control for country-and year-fixed
effects, but also to compare “urban” opposition movements both with other movements as well as
situations in which there is no organized mass opposition movement.
We find that anti-regime opposition movements are far more likely to induce democratic out-
comes – particularly in societies that display fairly high degrees of urbanization – if they are
dominated by urban middle classes or by industrial workers. Opposition movements dominated by
other groups, such as peasants, are far less likely to induce democratization – indeed, they do not
even seem to raise the likelihood of democratization relative to situations without any opposition
mobilization. This finding is extremely robust, and holds for instance when controlling for other
features of the opposition movement, such as its size, or when accounting for urban opposition
movements being more common in certain countries and time periods. It also holds up in instru-
mental variable and other models accounting for the potential endogeneity of opposition campaigns
and their social profile (e.g. because some groups are more likely to bandwagon on movements
perceived to have a greater chance in successfully inducing democratization).
The further analysis separating between urban middle classes and industrial workers speaks
to a long-standing debate in the democratization literature: While scholars with quite different
theoretical leanings propose that urban social groups may engender democracy, there is much
more disagreement on which particular group is the most relevant. Moore (1966) proposes that
revolutions dominated by the bourgeoisie are more conducive to democratic outcomes than other
revolutionary movements, and numerous other contributions (e.g., Lipset, 1959; Ansell and Samuels,
2014) consider the urban middle classes as the key agent of democratization. In contrast, scholars
such as O’Donnell (1973), Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) and Collier (1999) argue
that the industrial working class – due to clearer preferences for mass democracy and strong
organizational capacities – is typically the main driver of democratization. While we do find
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evidence suggesting that campaigns dominated by both groups are conducive to democratization,
our results are much more robust for opposition movements dominated by industrial workers.
In the next section we provide a review of different strands of relevant literatures. After that,
we further elaborate on why both industrial workers and urban middle classes (often) have the
requisite motivation and capacity to effectively engender democratization. Thereafter, we present
the data on opposition movements, and discuss issues of coding protocol and reliability and validity.
Next we discuss results from, first, our cross-sectional campaign-level analysis and, second, our core
country-year panel specifications. Before concluding, we evaluate different potential sources of bias
and introduce relevant additional tests to assess the sensitivity of our core results.
2 Argument
2.1 Literature review
Democratic transitions often emerge from organized mass movements forcing the incumbent
regime from power (either by violent or non-violent means). These are often referred to as “demo-
cratic revolutions”. In recent decades, organized collective action based in one or more broad social
groups has been instrumental for the democratization of countries in Latin America (Collier, 1999),
Eastern Europe (McFaul, 2002), Sub-Saharan Africa (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997) and even the
Middle-East (Tunisia, Stepan, 2012). Democratization can also be the end-result of other processes,
including military coups (Powell, 2012), negotiated transitions between elite groups (O’Donnell and
Schmitter, 1986), the incumbent relinquishing office more or less voluntarily (Bunce and Wolchik,
2010), or guided “top-down” liberalization by the existing regime (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).
Still, even in many such cases the outcomes are preceded, and likely even be triggered by, mass upris-
ings. Mass uprisings can put pressures on elites bargaining for a “pacted transition” (Collier, 1999),
outright scare autocratic incumbents to provide democratic concessions (Acemoglu and Robinson,
2006), or even increase chances of a coup d’e´tat against the old regime (Casper and Tyson, 2014).
The share of regime changes stemming from actions by broad popular movements also seems to
have been increasing (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz, 2014). As Teorell (2010, 100) notes “collective
action undertaken by the mass public appears to have been a widely occurring phenomenon, with
alleged democracy-enhancing effects” during the “third wave of democratization”.
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Yet, some opposition movements are successful in overthrowing authoritarian regimes and install
democracy – or, at least force incumbent regimes to partly liberalize – whereas others are not.
Why is this so? Relying on a recent, extensive dataset on major protest movements (Chenoweth
and Stephan, 2011), an emerging literature has offered systematic investigations of opposition
movements and their effects, also on democratization. These studies have mostly focused on tactical
choices made by opposition movements (particularly use of violence), and their cooperation with
external agents or strategic interactions with the regime. A prominent finding is that non-violent
mass mobilization, in particular, is an effective democratizing force (e.g., Chenoweth and Stephan,
2011; Chenoweth and Cunningham, 2013; Celestino Rivera and Gleditsch, 2013; Bayer, Bethke and
Lambach, 2016). Other studies have suggested that structural factors, such as industrialization,
help explain features and outcomes of social movements (Butcher and Svensson, 2014; Chenoweth
and Ulfelder, 2015).
Yet, we still do not know whether the social background of those mobilizing matters. A promis-
ing set of clues to answering this question comes from the theoretical and case-study literature
on the social composition of revolutionary movements. Marx & Engels (2010/1848) famously
claimed that “liberal bourgeois democracy” is brought about by the capitalist bourgeoisie revolting
against the old feudal order, while the next phase of revolution is acted out by the working class,
turning against the bourgeoisie. While this Marxist theory no longer dominates democratization
scholarship, one key notion has survived: Economic modernization and industrialization is widely
presumed to empower and articulate the interests of “new” social groups, such as the urban mid-
dle class and industrial workers, and these groups have an interest in democratic change. Where
scholars part ways, however, is in their favored candidate for “most important group” in mobilizing
for democracy.1
Many contributions – some subsumed under the heading of “modernization theory” – highlight
that industrialization and urbanization strengthen the urban middle class, which will be both
1Some contributions, such as Luebbert (1991), provide more complex hypotheses highlighting cross-class coalitions.
Coalitions between the urban bourgeoisie and workers (Luebbert, 1991), or even peasants and urban middle-classes
(Rokkan, 1999), have been proposed as conducive to democratization. Related, Goldstone (2011) argues that broad
cross-class-coalitions are successful in virtue of their encompassing nature rather than the identity of its participants.
We test for the importance of cross-class coalitions below, finding clear evidence that broader coalitions, as such,
enhance democratization.
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capable of, and interested in, bringing about democratic regime change (e.g., Lipset, 1959; Glaeser,
Ponzetto and Shleifer, 2007).2 One stream of research, spearheaded by Inglehart and Welzel (2006),
suggests that the middle class – due to favorable educational and material circumstances – should
develop particular values, resulting in a strong desire for democratic institutions. Pursuing a quite
different argument, Ansell and Samuels (2014) highlight that urban elites and middle classes prosper
from industrialization, increased trade, and wider economic development, and that democracy
provides an institutional framework for protecting their property against predation by “old” elite
groups. They present indirect evidence for the hypothesis that strong urban middle classes induce
democratization, showing that income inequality – taken as a proxy for middle class strength
– is related to democratization. Using different proxies for middle class strength on a panel of
developing countries from 1985–2013, Chun et al. (2015) also find that strong middle classes promote
democratization.
Alternative arguments contend that the industrial working class is the main agent of democ-
ratization, simultaneously highlighting that urban upper- and middle classes, in certain contexts,
have direct incentives to ally with other elites and work against democratization (see O’Donnell,
1973).3 Notably, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) argue that large numbers and orga-
nizational strength will give industrial workers leverage under a democratic system (something the
success of labor parties testaments to), providing strong incentives to fight for the introduction of
mass democracy. In contrast, the bourgeoisie often lacks the incentives to expand full democratic
rights, including suffrage, to the poorer segments of the population, whereas peasants do not have
the capacity to organize a concerted effort challenging the established regime. Collier (1999) –
investigating 27 cases from Western Europe and South America (10 from the 19th and early 20th
centuries and 17 from the 1970s onwards) – also proposes a key role for the working class in en-
2While we simplify and treat them as one group (“urban middle classes”) below, there may be disparities in
income/wealth and in political incentives between urban capital owners, urban professionals and urban white collar
workers. Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992), for example, use the term bourgeoisie for wealthy capital
owners, and also distinguish various urban middle income groups. Nonetheless, urban white collar workers and pro-
fessionals earn incomes far above the median in all real-world contexts (Ansell and Samuels, 2014), and redistributive
and other policy interests of these urban actors often converge.
3Also contrasting with the focus on urban middle classes, different “redistributivist theories” suggest that less
wealthy actors have the strongest incentives to mobilize for democratization (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000,
2006; Boix, 2003). However, the relevance for industrial workers has been challenged on grounds that industrial
workers typically earn more than the median income earner (Ansell and Samuels, 2014).
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gendering democratization. Extant large-n studies finding that franchise extensions often followed
revolutionary threats also refer to threats of revolutions by industrial workers, more specifically,
as precipitating democratization in the 19th and early 20th century (Aidt and Jensen, 2014; Prze-
worski, 2009). Still, there is no direct measurement of the worker-dominance of revolutions in the
latter analyses.
More generally, despite the many excellent contributions reviewed above, the nature of the
extant evidence means that we do not yet know whether it matters for democratization, in general,
which particular social group is pushing for change. Empirical studies that deal directly with the
role of social groups are mainly comparative-historical case studies. Findings vary substantially,
and seem sensitive to the choice of cases. For example, Moore’s conclusions on democratic outcomes
being indebted to the bourgeoisie draws on contrasting England, France and United States with
China and Japan. In contrast, O’Donnell (1973) argues that the urban middle classes may have
a detrimental impact on democratization, drawing on Latin American experiences, in particular
Argentina and Brazil in the 1960s. Large-N studies have also considered the role of social groups,
but then only indirectly, by relying on macro-structural features of the economy (such as GDP
per capita or economic inequality) to proxy for the interests and/or capacities of particular groups
(e.g., Lipset, 1959; Ansell and Samuels, 2014; Boix, 2003). While often plausible, this approach
also faces pitfalls. Crucially, there is no neat mapping from socioeconomic structure to social
group mobilization (nor to group interests or capacities), and proxies used are, at best, very noisy
measures. To exemplify, measures of urbanization and the industrial sector’s share of GDP do not
separate well between the strength of urban middle classes and industrial workers.4 This approach
also misses that hurdles for collective action may vary by group (and across contexts) – peasants
may face higher hurdles for organizing than industrial workers – making it problematic to equate
economic structures with the agency of particular groups.5
4To take another example, Ansell and Samuels (2014) argue that while previous literature has assumed that high
inequality entails that workers and middle classes should prefer redistribution (and thus democracy as an institutional
guarantee) from above-median income groups to below-median income groups, this assumption does not withstand
scrutiny. Workers and urban middle classes are often located well above the median of the income distribution.
5In addition to small-n and large-n contributions, excellent qualitative studies on a medium-large number of cases
have been conducted (see especially Collier, 1999). Still, they arguably face issues also faced by small-N studies,
most notably a difficulty of implementing a systematic control strategy and lack of explicit tools for evaluating the
uncertainty of the inferences drawn.
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2.2 Urban groups as agents of democratization: Motivation and capacity
In this section, we synthesize arguments from the reviewed literature and further clarify why
movements dominated by industrial workers or by the urban middles classes should be conducive
to democratization. We shall assume that a social group’s potential for bringing about democracy
through mobilizing a mass movement is a function of the group’s motivation and capacities. For
successful democratization to occur, potential protesters should be motivated to confront the in-
cumbent regime and work towards installing a more democratic system. In addition, they must
face a favorable opportunity structure which is, in no small part, a function of the group’s ability to
organize effective collection action. We first discuss motivation before turning to capacity aspects.
Some social groups may simply prefer democratization more strongly than others. One straight-
forward reason, which figures prominently in the literature, is differential economic benefits from
democratization. One influential argument is that relatively poor but numerically strong groups
should favor democratization, since democracy allows them to win elections and subsequently leg-
islate progressive redistributive policies (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003). In rural and
less industrialized contexts this should make peasants, who are typically both poor and numerous,
ardent supporters of democracy. Groups that are (typically) less numerous and wealthier, such as
landowners or military officers, should be less likely to support democracy according to this logic.
While redistributive models of democratization have received their share of criticism, also on
empirical grounds (e.g., Houle, 2009; Teorell, 2010), we can relax the assumption of redistribution
as the key motivational force for democratization, but maintain the assumption that numerosity
is important: If we assume, first, that individuals with similar socioeconomic features (type of
occupation, education, and income, etc.) are more likely to hold converging preferences also over
other policies than redistribution (family policies, work regulations, free trade, etc.) and, second
we maintain that numerical strength yields electoral success, larger social groups should be more
likely to prefer democracy. Simply put, democracy presents large groups with the institutional
framework for enacting legislation that they favor (in different policy areas).6
6This argument is simplified and not comprehensive. Social groups might systematically differ in their preference
for democracy also for other reasons than merely instrumental. Modernization theoretic approaches (e.g., Inglehart
and Welzel, 2006; Welzel, 2013) suggest that the material security of the middle class – at least in relatively wealthy
countries – may generate inherent normative preference for more liberal institutions and policies. It presumably
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In static economies, social groups with converging preferences and numerical majority should
prefer democracy. Industrial workers and urban middle classes , for example, should have a clear
preference for democracy in highly urbanized, industrial societies, but not necessarily in predomi-
nantly agrarian, rural societies. Still, in a dynamic economy – e.g. characterized by rapid industri-
alization and urbanization – numerically large but declining groups, such as peasants, should not
always prefer democracy. In contrast, groups on the rise, such as industrial workers, might. When
a social group expects to become a minority in the near to medium term, majority rule may imply
that policies will be determined by other groups in the future. Thus, urban middle classes and
industrial workers should have particularly strong preferences for democracy in societies that are
already fairly urbanized and industrialized, and where de-urbanization and de-industrialization are
not expected to occur (at rapid rates) in the medium term. While processes of industrialization have
come at different points in time for different countries – and processes of de-industrialization have
set in for some richer countries in recent decades – urbanization processes have been widespread
especially from the 1950s in most regions (Satterthwaite, 2007), and have yet to show signs of
reversal. Thus, urban groups, at least in many developing countries, may expectedly have turned
more motivated to pursue democratization during the latter half of the 20th century.7
Regarding the capacity of a social group to bring about democratization, this relates both to
abilities to co-ordinate collective action and to more general leverage. Leverage refers to the power
resources that a group can draw on in order to inflict costs on the regime, and thereby pressure the
regime to achieve its demands (for instance political liberalization). This relates, for instance, to the
ability to grind the economy to a halt (thereby reducing tax revenues), e.g. through moving capital
assets abroad or through carrying out strikes in vital sectors. Groups will differ in their ability to
inflict such economic damage, and thus presumably in their abilities to force regime change. Other
sources of leverage are easy access to weapons and manpower with relevant training, or having a
militant ideology that can motivate recruits.
follows that middle class opposition campaigns should, everything else equal, display a particularly strong relationship
with subsequent democratization.
7While patterns of relative numerosity and expected growth vary according to different factors, one could speculate
that industrial workers may fit the description (of a large group that continues to grow) better in intermediate stages
of industrialization, and the middle classes could fit better in later stages of industrialization and de-industrialization
with labor-saving technological advances and high-income service sector jobs on the rise.
9
Having the ability to organize large-scale collective action, such as riots or mass protests, is also
vital for bringing about democratization. Large-scale collective action can result in democratization
through various paths, as noted in the literature review. First, it may bring the incumbent regime
to an involuntary end, either directly (popular revolution) or indirectly (e.g., by triggering a coup
d’e´tat Casper and Tyson, 2014; Wig and Rød, 2014). Second, it may do so by “persuading”
the incumbent to liberalize, or else s/he will face even worse consequences (see, e.g., Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2006). The key question then becomes: Which features determine a group’s ability to co-
ordinate large-scale collective action? We surmise that this relates especially to the ability to create
permanent and streamlined organizations (with some form of centralization of decision making
power). Such organizations help with alleviating collective action problems among group members
by, e.g., providing tools for effective information and dispersing side-payments for participants
(Olson, 1965). But, creating organizations also help with recruiting new individuals for the cause,
networking with foreign actors, experimenting with and (over time) learning effective tactics for
pressuring the regime, and maintaining a fairly stable repertoire of crucial skills and manpower.
Groups that can build comprehensive and enduring organizations should therefore have a stronger
capacity to enact democratic change.
Regarding the different groups, industrial workers should score high on the organizational aspect
of movement capacity. In many countries, industrial workers are organized under labor unions and
labor parties (which often exist illegally even in autocracies banning them), giving them a potent
institutional infrastructure for successfully orchestrating mass resistance. Workers often also have
expansive international networks, either formally through international labor organizations or the
Socialist International, or informally through more amorphous cross-border networks in the labor
movement. Labor unions, for instance, are also known for enforcing strict discipline and organiza-
tion on their members (see, e.g., Olson, 1965). Regarding the leverage aspect, industrial workers
are often uniquely endowed with a strategic stranglehold over the economy through the ability to
organize nationwide or localized strikes targeting crucial sources of revenue for the regime. Second,
workers will also have fairly high military potential, due to their supreme organizational skills,
foreign networks, and historically often being related to explicitly revolutionary (and sometimes
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violence-condoning) ideologies (see, e.g., Hobsbawm, 1974).
Similarly, urban middle classes should have potent sources of both organizational capacity
and strategic leverage over authoritarian regimes. First, urban middle classes will often include
large a pool of individuals with organizational skills and resources, equipping them to overcome
collective action problems. This is reflected in the large number of civil society organizations, liberal
parties, professional associations, student organizations and educational institutions that are often
associated with the urban middle classes. As for industrial workers, urban middle classes will
also often have access to international networks that enable successful collective action, examples
being student networks, human rights advocacy organizations, and international media. Regarding
leverage, urban professionals often occupy vital inflection points in the economy, example in vital
service sectors such as finance. They might also be particularly skilled when it comes to putting
pressure on the regime through non-violent conflict; utilizing comparatively high levels of human
capital to legitimate their movement and strategically targeting the regime’s soft spots (see, e.g.,
Dahlum, 2015).
Regarding other groups, military officers obviously score high on leverage (due to control over
firepower) but also organizational capacity. But, as noted, it is questionable whether they would
want to use this capacity for organizing mass movements that engender democratization. We also
discussed how peasants, at least in rural societies, could have the requisite motivation, due to their
numbers. Scholars such as Stephens (1989) have then also argued that peasants – under certain
conditions – can be instrumental in democratic revolutions. Still, peasants presumably score low
in terms of capacity to effectuate regime change. One common notion is that this group lacks the
ability to organize and express a common interest (see, e.g., Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens,
1992; Kimeldorf, 2013), and overcoming collective action problems may be more difficult due to
typically dispersed settlement patterns. Peasants are supposedly also more easily co-opted through
clientelistic practices or intimidated to fall in line with interests of the landed aristocracy (see, e.g.,
Ardanaz and Mares, 2013), who are often fierce opponents of democratization (Ansell and Samuels,
2014).
In sum, we surmise that social group must have both a clear preference for democracy and the
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capacity to remove the incumbent autocratic regime in order to be an effective agent of democ-
ratization. Some groups, such as peasants, may in some contexts have the requisite motivation,
but lack in capacity. Other groups, such as landowners or military officers, are strong in terms of
capacity, but may lack the motivation to pursue democratization. In contrast, industrial workers
and urban middle classes should – especially in fairly urban, industrial societies – display the re-
quired combination of capacity and motivation. At a more detailed level, the two groups may differ
regarding what drives their preference for democracy, and particularly their sources of organiza-
tional capacity and leverage. Nevertheless, we expect both groups to be strong candidates to lead
opposition campaigns that induce democratizing regime changes.
3 Data
3.1 Social groups and opposition movements
In order to systematically code the social profile of anti-regime opposition movements we identify
our units using the recent NAVCO dataset (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013). NAVCO describes various
properties of (fairly large-scale) such opposition campaigns globally from 1900 onwards. Each
campaign represents:
a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a
political objective. Campaigns are observable, meaning that the tactics used are overt
and documented. A campaign is continuous and lasts anywhere from days to years,
distinguishing it from one-off events or revolts. Campaigns are also purposive, meaning
that they are consciously acting with a specific objective in mind, such as expelling a
foreign occupier or overthrowing a domestic regime. (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013, pp.)
To be considered a campaign, movements must have a discernible leadership, at least 1000
observed participants, and a coherent organization. Into this template, we introduce the concept
of a social group, defined as a group of individuals with a common social identity and/or a similar
role in the economy giving them converging interests. This is purposively defined in a rough and
inclusive way, allowing for the inclusion of various – and even some partly overlapping – categories.
We collect data on the presence and participation of different social groups in all campaigns that
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NAVCO identifies as aiming for regime change or “other goals”, including policy concessions or
political liberalization.8 There are 203 relevant campaigns in NAVCO, and we have collected
information on social composition for 193. The 10 remaining are missing due to no – or too
uncertain – information. We discuss the categorizations in Appendix A, but the core categories
are Peasants; Public sector employees; Military employees; Religious or ethnic groups; Industrial
workers; and, Urban middle classes.
We here restrict our focus to Industrial workers and Urban middle classes. Campaigns “as-
sociated with” (as further specified below) all other groups are therefore considered as “other
campaigns” (see Appendix Table C.12 for regression models distinguishing between these “other”
campaigns). Industrial workers refer to labor employed in the manufacturing and mining sectors.
The Urban middle classes category is complex, and we have coded this to encompass business elites,
smaller merchants, professionals (lawyers, doctors, etc), and students. Importantly, we code and
treat public sector employees as separate from urban middle classes. First, these are often men-
tioned separately in the sources used. Second, and more importantly, their tighter relationship with
the state – and thus the government in many instances – means that their motivation to instigate
regime change may differ. However, this choice is surely debatable, and we thus run analyzes with
and without public sector employees included in the urban middle classes category (results turn
out very similar, as displayed in Table 6).
For each social group, we code involvement in protest campaigns. The detailed coding rules
and procedures are discussed in Appendix A. But, in brief, we have drawn on different sources,
including some covering multiple movements and countries, notably the Global Non Violent Action
database (Swarthmore, 2015), a global catalogue of non-violent mass movements listing the social-
group composition of movements and other features. Other important sources include International
Encyclopedia of Revolutions and Protest (Ness, 2015), but we also draw information from (cross-
country and country-specific) secondary sources where necessary. In many sources, our social-group
categories are often explicitly listed; a source might, e.g., explicitly note that a movement was
dominated by industrial workers, and that peasants also participated.
8This means that we have not coded social group characteristics for secessionist movements. We consider seces-
sionist movements to be qualitatively different, and not obviously relevant for our research question.
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Specifically, we code three indicators representing different degrees of involvement. First, we
code whether the social group had some level of participation; i.e., we register whether the move-
ment at some point in time consisted partly of members of the social group. Operationally, for
this “low-threshold” dummy to be scored 1, the social group must at least be mentioned in one
source. This is fairly easy to gauge, especially since the mentioned databases include lists of social-
group participation where our categories are included.9 Second, we code whether a movement
originated among members of the given social group, scored as such if mentioned explicitly in his-
torical sources. Third, we code whether the opposition movement is dominated by the group. Such
instances include when a social group include makes up a majority of campaign members or if it,
according to sources, was highly influential for the movement. While the latter obviously requires
subjective evaluation, we carefully streamlined the coding through different procedures, as clarified
in the Appendix. In general, we opted to be conservative when setting the threshold for “highly
influential”. For all variables, our coders (RAs) have explicitly assessed their degree of certainty for
each coding, ranging from very uncertain to very certain. Thus, we can run tests to check whether
results are vulnerable to excluding the more uncertain cases (see Table 6; we remind that the most
uncertain cases are always treated as missing).
One challenge is that source coverage might correlate with the outcome variable. While the data
only include campaigns with at least 1000 participants, that are “observable”, “continuous” and
have a “discernible leadership” (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013) – we thus mostly deal with campaigns
that are well covered, this can not be excluded. Nonetheless, different assessments provide room
for optimism: For instance, if data availability and quality is systematically poorer for violent
campaigns (often smaller and carried out in poor, remote areas), which extant studies have shown
are less conducive to democratization, this could yield bias if groups differ in the likelihood of
participating in violent and non-violent campaigns. Yet, there is virtually no correlation (r=.01)
between “uncertainty status” of the coding and violence. Meanwhile, the correlation between
uncertainty status and participation by urban middle classes (r=-.13) or industrial workers ((r=-
.06)) are also low. Without downplaying reliability and validity issues by too much, we find it
9We emphasize that we do not interpret a 0 on this measure to mean that no single individual from the social
group partook. Rather, the presence of the social group was not big enough to be recognized in the source materials.
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Table 1: Descriptives for Urban middle classes (MC) and Industrial worker (IW) campaign profile
variables
Sum N Share
MC dominates 41 187 0.22
MC participates 148 188 0.79
Originated among MC 37 180 0.21
IW dominate 29 192 0.15
IW participate 116 186 0.62
Originated among IW 19 192 0.10
Note: Number of cases coded varies between variables due to varying
levels of uncertainty. Highly uncertain cases are treated as missing.
unlikely that measurement error issues should drive the robust results presented below.
Let us briefly illustrate the coding scheme with two examples (see Appendix for further illus-
trations). First, the Velvet Revolution against the Czechoslovakian Communist regime in 1989 is
described in the identified sources as a broad-based movement consisting of urban middle classes,
industrial workers and peasants. This campaign is thus coded as consisting of all these three groups.
According to, for instance, the Swarthmore database, the movement was sparked off by student
demonstrations on International Students Day in November 1989, which soon developed into larger-
scale demonstrations including other groups. Moreover, the Swarthmore database describes the
Public Against Violence organization – made up of, e.g., artists, scientists and intellectuals – as
the“leading force” of the movement. The movement is therefore coded as having originated among,
and as being dominated by, the urban middle class. Second, the Senderista Insurgency (Sendero
Luminoso) against the Peruvian government from 1980-1999 is described by several sources (e.g.,
Swarthmore, 2015) as being founded by an alliance of peasants and a student group in San Cristo-
bal. Hence, it is coded as having originated among and consisting of peasants and urban middle
classes. Global Britannica states that throughout its lifespan, the movement’s main recruiting base
was among indigenous peasants and from poorer urban districts, and that these groups were in
majority and dominated the campaign during its final ten years. Hence, it is coded as dominated
by peasants.
Table 1 shows descriptives for the set of binary variables (originated; dominated; participated)
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Figure 1: Social group profile of opposition movements over time. Campaigns dominated by peas-
ants, urban middle classes, and industrial workers.
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for urban middle classes (MC) and industrial workers (IW). Appendix B provides additional descrip-
tive statistics. Overall, industrial workers participated in 62 percent of our registered campaigns,
whereas urban middle classes participated in 79 percent. However, only about 1/5 campaigns were
dominated by the urban middle classes, and likewise for industrial workers. Figure 1 charts the
share of ongoing campaigns dominated by a given social group – we here include peasant campaigns
for illustration – as distributed by decade. While the shares fluctuate, the figure reveals that the
number of peasant-dominated protests went down towards the end of the 20th century, and that
industrial-worker and urban-middle class dominated campaigns increased. This is not surprising
as ongoing processes of urbanization and industrialization should empower these urban groups in
many countries.
3.2 Democracy
For our dependent variable, we draw on two (quite different) measures of electoral democracy
with extensive coverage. First, we code democratization using the binary democracy measure from
Boix, Miller and Rosato (2012) (BMR). BMR basically registers the presence of contested and
“free and fair” elections, while also requiring that 1/4 of citizens are enfranchised. Due to its
binary nature, democratization (from 0 on BMR in t to 1 in t + 1) will mainly pick up major
regime changes, and – as we will elaborate on below – it may miss out on non-trivial episodes
of “liberalization” in nominally autocratic regimes and “democratic deepening” in regimes that
16
already pass the democracy threshold.
Thus, our main measure – allowing us to capture more incremental and less rapturous de-
mocratizing changes, including many franchise extensions – is the continuous Electoral Democracy
measure, also called Polyarchy, from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) (Coppedge et al., 2015). The
theoretical range is from 0–1 (0.01–0.95 in the data). Polyarchy includes indicators on whether or
not the chief executive is (directly or indirectly) elected, the extent to which elections are “clean”,
the freedoms of association and speech (due to the importance of free formation of parties and open
discussion in ensuring truly competitive elections), and suffrage extension. Hence, it mainly caters
to the conditions for elite competition through multi-party elections and the right to participate in
these elections.
4 Empirical analysis
Figure 2 shows the pre- and post-movement levels of Polyarchy – measured at the campaign’s
start and end years – for campaigns dominated by different groups (we include peasants for illustra-
tion). We note that cases on/above/below the diagonal indicate, respectively no/positive/negative
change in Polyarchy. Most urban middle class-dominated and worker-dominated campaigns are
associated either with no change or with democratic improvements. Indicatively, the three cam-
paigns associated with the greatest increases in Polyarchy score in our sample were either dominated
by industrial workers (1983-89 Chilean campaign against Pinochet; 1984-85 Uruguayan campaign
against the military regime) or by urban middle classes (1989 Czechoslovakian Velvet Revolution).
In contrast, peasant dominated campaigns are notably associated with democratic backsliding.
Still, we cannot draw any inferences about social groups and democratization from this. Dif-
ferent types of groups may dominate in very different societies, and campaigns might just happen
to co-exist with changes in democracy without playing any systematic causal role. Thus, we probe
a series of regression models trying to account for these and other methodological issues. We have
two main aims with our analysis: First, we seek a systematic and robust description of the asso-
ciations between social-group composition of opposition movements and democratization. Second,
we want to provide estimates of causal effects. While often implicit, the notion of such an effect
also underpins the reviewed literature linking social groups to democracy. Democratization results
17
Figure 2: Opposition movements dominated by industrial workers, urban middle classes, and peas-
ants, and changes in Electoral Democracy Index/Polyarchy (V-Dem)
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
Electoral democracy changes
Electoral democracy campaign start
El
ec
to
ra
l d
em
oc
ra
cy
 c
am
pa
ig
n 
en
d
l
Peasants dominate
Urban middle classes dominate
Industrial workers dominate
because specific social groups mobilize.
As with other macro-level large-n studies, identifying effects with a fair degree of certainty is
challenging. Here, likely sources of endogeneity bias include particular social groups self-selecting
into particular movements. If certain groups have a stronger preference for democracy, this may
lead them to self-select into movements that are more likely to engender democratization (with
or without their participation). Second, there are several plausible confounding variables. For
example, if the majority of a country’s citizens are industrial workers, an observed movement will
likely be dominated by this group (the probability approaches 1 when group size approaches the
total population). Further, if movement size affects outcomes (e.g., Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011),
this may yield biased estimates if unaccounted for. On the flip-side, controlling for movement
size might induce post-treatment bias; as we have argued, differential capacities between social
groups in organizing large-scale collective action constitute an inherent property of likely causal
relevance. This suggests that there is no “quick fix” to handle all potential issues in one single
model. Therefore, we employ a series of slightly different approaches and designs that, when taken
18
together, help shore up confidence in the causal interpretation of our results.
4.1 Cross-sectional analysis at the campaign level
In order to first describe associations between opposition movement profile and post-movement
regime outcome, we start by investigating a simple cross-section of opposition campaigns. Results
pertaining to the broader question of whether campaigns dominated by (either of the two) urban
groups differ from other campaigns are presented in the four left-most columns of Table 2. Model
1 employs a dummy of democratization as dependent variable – scored 1 if the country was coded
autocratic by BMR at campaign start and democratic one year after campaign end – and thus only
include observations that were autocratic at campaign start. In our main (country-year) analysis,
we employ logit models on this dependent variable, but since the purpose here is description we
report OLS models for ease of interpretation (results in terms of statistical significance are very
similar for logit specifications, see Appendix Table C.2). The coefficient for urban group dominated
campaign (UG) in Model 1 suggests that the probability of observing democratization increases by
18 percentage points when comparing a campaign dominated either by industrial workers or urban
middle classes to other campaigns. This is substantial, particularly given that overall probability
of democratization in the sample of 140 campaigns (in autocracies) is 27 percent.
This association could, however, be due to industrial worker or middle class campaigns occurring
more frequently in, for instance, wealthy countries. We thus condition on potentially relevant
country- and campaign-level covariates. At the country-level, we control for ln population, ln (real,
PP-adjusted) GDP per capita, and urbanization, all registered at campaign outset and collected
from V-Dem (see Coppedge et al., 2015). At the campaign-level, we control for ln participants
in campaign – urban campaigns may enhance democratization simply because they happen to
be larger. (But, we remind that campaign size can be considered an inherently relevant feature,
as our theoretical argument on capacity to organize collective action suggests, which is why we
drop it in our main models). UG drops – and loses statistical significance, with t = 1.5 – when
conditioning on these covariates in Model 2, although urban campaigns are predicted to be followed
by a 12 percentage point higher probability of observing democratization when holding campaign
size, population size, income and urbanization level constant. Results are strengthened, and weakly
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Table 2: Campaign-level (cross sectional) correlates of democratization.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable Democratic transition (0 to 1 on BMR) Polyarchy from V-Dem (0–1 scale)
Ind work OR mid cl dominate (UG) 0.183** 0.116 0.088*** 0.062*
(2.59) (1.46) (3.03) (1.97)
Industrial workers dominate (IW) 0.213** 0.151 0.126*** 0.101**
(2.39) (1.59) (3.30) (2.53)
Middle class dominate (MC) 0.118 0.089 0.033 0.023
(1.41) (1.01) (0.97) (0.66)
Ln campaign participants 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.10) (0.50) (0.18) (0.60)
Urbanization 0.514* 0.211* 0.511* 0.204*
(1.77) (1.85) (1.77) (1.80)
Ln population -0.009 -0.001 -0.008 -0.001
(-0.38) (-0.12) (-0.31) (-0.11)
Ln GDP per capita 0.052 0.035 0.046 0.033
(0.77) (1.28) (0.68) (1.24)
Lagged dependent variable 0.666*** 0.470*** 0.677*** 0.494***
(8.18) (5.08) (8.38) (5.32)
Constant 0.135*** -0.253 0.139*** -0.117 0.131*** -0.248 0.136*** -0.116
(3.42) (-0.45) (4.84) (-0.52) (3.40) (-0.44) (4.80) (-0.52)
N 140 122 176 155 139 121 175 154
R2 0.046 0.146 0.307 0.345 0.073 0.165 0.329 0.364
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. T-values in parentheses.
OLS regressions with campaign as cross-section unit.
significant, for this (and other) model(s) when measuring democratization in the somewhat longer
term, including transitions up to 5 years after campaign end (see Appendix Tables C.1 and C.2).
As expected, results are also much clearer when employing the more fine-grained Polyarchy
measure from V-Dem, also allowing us to capture more incremental changes in countries that
remain autocratic and those that are already minimum democracies. To consider correlates with
changes in democracy, we condition on the lagged dependent variable (i.e., we consider correlates
of post-campaign democracy, holding constant the level of democracy at campaign start). Model
3 includes 176 campaigns, and reveals a highly significant UG coefficient (t = 3.0). The t-value
decreases, but only to 2.0, when conditioning on the above-mentioned campaign- and country-level
covariates. Holding these factors constant, urban campaigns are predicted to be associated with
an additional 0.06 increase in Polyarchy compared to other campaigns. For illustration, this is
comparable to the change observed in Ukraine from the start of the Orange Revolution to the year
after it finished (0.05).
The four rightmost columns in Table 2 display structurally similar models, but where we ex-
change UG with two dummy variables distinguishing industrial worker- (IW ) from urban middle
class (MC) dominated campaigns. Results are clear on the association between IW and democrati-
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zation, especially when employing Polyarchy. MC coefficients are comparatively smaller (about half
of IW in BMR models and about one quarter in Polyarchy models), and t-values range from 0.7–
1.4. This provides an initial suggestion that the hypothesis concerning industrial worker campaigns
leading to more democratic outcomes finds stronger support in the data than the corresponding
hypothesis for urban middle class campaigns. This echoes the arguments and historical case-based
evidence in, for instance, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) and Collier (1999).
4.2 Cross-section time-series analysis: Benchmark model
While indicative, campaign-level cross-section models are not fully adequate for answering the
question of whether campaign social profile matters. First, they do not include information on years
without any campaign, disallowing comparisons between campaigns with a given social profile and
situations where no campaign exists. Second, since campaigns with specific profiles presumably
relate differently to background covariates, including information on covariates from additional
years should improve comparisons also between campaigns. Third, controlling for country- and
year-fixed effects is not feasible in the cross-section (campagin) set-up. There may well be country-
specific features, related e.g. to geography or political culture, that correlate with the motivations
and capacities of different groups to mobilize opposition and with democratization. There may also
be global trends both in democratization and campaign profiles, for instance with increased chances
of democratization and more urban opposition campaigns right after the Cold War. Therefore, we
move to a country-year setup, and estimate models of the form:
DEMi,t+1 = β0 + β1IWi,t + β2MCi,t + β3OCi,t + β4DEMi,t + µXi,t + ζi + θt + i,t (1)
DEMi,t+1 represents democracy led by one year (t+ 1) in country i. We also test and discuss
models where change in democracy level from t to t+ 1 is the dependent variable, including models
only counting positive/democratizing changes, and results are robust. IW and MC register the
presence of an ongoing campaign dominated by, respectively, industrial workers and urban middle
classes. (Alternatively, we substitute these two dummies with the combined UG dummy). OC
registers the presence of all other campaigns, i.e. those dominated by other groups such as peasants,
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Table 3: Core cross-section time series models
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Estimator FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE Logit Logit Logit
Dependent variable V-Dem Polyarchy ∆ Polyarchy Upturns Polyar. BMR democratization
IW or MC dominate 0.047*** 0.850 1.381***
(3.98) (1.36) (2.75)
IW dominate 0.049** 0.049** 0.044** 0.973**
(2.55) (2.55) (2.59) (2.28)
MC dominate 0.034* 0.034* 0.036** 1.450***
(1.86) (1.86) (2.22) (3.68)
Other campaign (OC) -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 0.006** 0.916* 0.796** 0.777**
(-0.58) (-0.73) (-0.73) (2.12) (1.83) (2.13) (2.25)
Ln GDP p.c. 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.001 1.026* 0.514** 0.401*
(0.78) (0.74) (0.74) (-0.33) (1.89) (2.23) (1.78)
Ln Population -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.874 -0.023 0.004
(-0.24) (-0.23) (-0.23) (1.32) (-0.88) (-0.26) (0.05)
Urbanization 0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 0.021** -5.011 -0.190 0.358
(2.14) (2.16) (2.16) (2.00) (-1.56) (-0.21) (0.43)
Lagged Polyarchy 0.948*** 0.948*** -0.052*** -0.037***
(166.15) (169.73) (-9.27) (-7.37)
Country dummies Y Y Y Y N Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 9739 9738 9738 9738 2763 3149 4698
Countries 147 147 147 147 68 121 121
Max time series 1900–2010 1900–2010 1900–2010 1900–2010 1900–2010 1900–2010 1900–2010
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. T-values in parentheses.
Except for in Model 3, errors are clustered by country.
or where no group clearly dominates. We also include level of democracy at t (DEMi,t), and vectors
of country-year covariates X, country-fixed effects ζ, and year-fixed effects θ. Errors are clustered
by country to account for panel-level autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
Table 3 presents two versions of our benchmark fixed effects (FE) OLS model with Polyarchy
as dependent variable. These models draw on almost 10 000 observations, taken from 147 countries
and maximum time series from 1900–2010. Model 1 employs the cruder UG dummy, whereas Model
2 rather includes IW and MC. The inclusion of OC implies that the “reference category” is no
ongoing opposition campaign.
According to Model 1, an ongoing opposition campaign dominated by one of the two urban
groups systematically increases democracy in the following year compared to when there is no
ongoing opposition campaign. UG is highly significant (t = 4.0), and predicts that an urban group-
dominated opposition campaign is associated with a Polyarchy score that is about 0.05 points
higher in the following year. Since OC is negative, but close to 0 (and t = 0.6), opposition cam-
paigns dominated by urban groups are systematically associated with democratic change also when
compared to situations with other ongoing opposition campaigns. In Model 2, the IW coefficient is
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virtually similar (0.49 instead of 0.47) to UG in Model 1, whereas MC is somewhat smaller (0.34).
Both coefficients are at least weakly significant, with t-values of 2.6 and 1.9, respectively. Hence,
there is clear evidence for a positive association between industrial worker campaigns and democra-
tization, and somewhat less clear evidence for an association between middle class campaigns and
democratization.
Results are virtually similar if we rather employ changes in Polyarchy score (from t to t + 1)
directly as dependent variable (both when conditioning and not conditioning on level of Polyarchy;
see Appendix Table C.3). This is illustrated in Model 3, which is otherwise similar to the benchmark
specification, where IW and MC are identical in size and significance to the respective coefficients
in Model 1. We also run models considering relationships with “democratic upturns” and down-
turns” separately (see Teorell, 2010). In the theoretical discussion we mainly focused on how social
groups affect democratization, and not so much how they guard against democratic backsliding.
As results in Appendix Tables C.4 and C.10 reveal, results are robust and even clearer (for UG,
IW , and MC) when considering only the relationship with democratic upturns. This is illustrated
by Model 4, again a version of the benchmark specification (downturns are here scored as 0 on
the dependent variable). Model 4 shows that both industrial worker campaigns and urban middle
class campaigns are significantly related to subsequent increases in Polyarchy at the 5% level, and
coefficients are fairly close to those found for Model 1. However, there are also indications that
ongoing industrial worker campaigns, though not middle class campaigns, guard against subsequent
democratic backsliding, though coefficients are much smaller and only weakly significant in some
specifications. Hence, it is the association with subsequent democratization experiences that drive
results in our benchmark specification. We return to further robustness tests of these relationships
in the next section.
But first, Models 5–7 are logit equivalents of our benchmark model, using our dichotomous
measure of democratization (transition from BMR dictatorship in t to BMR democracy in t + 1)
as dependent variable and only including autocratic observations (in t). This reduces variation in
the dependent variable. For instance, only 102 instances of democratization are included for Model
5. In practice, we now ignore any impact opposition campaigns may have on de-democratization
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(which could come from opposition campaigns successfully implementing a new and more auto-
cratic regime, or the extant regime cracking down on political rights in response to an ongoing
campaign). We also ignore situations where institutions change in a more “liberal direction” with-
out tilting regimes across the “minimum democracy” threshold (to illustrate, countries with as
different regimes as North Korea and Taiwan were BMR autocracies in 1995). Similarly, we ig-
nore any impact campaigns may have in increasing level of democracy in regimes that have passed
the minimum threshold (to illustrate, in 1995, Colombia, Mali, and Pakistan had all passed this
threshold). Indeed, additional estimates using V-Dem’s Polyarchy as dependent variable suggest
that urban opposition campaigns may be associated with both liberalization in BMR autocracies
and further “democratic deepening” in BMR democracies (see Appendix Tables C.6–C.9). Thus,
these logit models may very well fail to pick up an effect, even if there is one.
Indeed, the fixed effects logit model (Model 5) fails to find a statistically significant UG at
conventional levels (t=1.4), although UG is positive and substantial in size. However, the issues
discussed above are expectedly exacerbated by including country-fixed effects. As shown by Beck
and Katz (2001), fixed effects logit models very often yield Type II errors when the dependent
variable changes seldom or not at all (only 68 countries can inform estimates in Model 3). When
omitting the country-fixed effects (but keeping year-fixed effects) in Model 6, the relationship be-
tween UG and BMR democratization retains statistical significance at 1%. Model 7 alters Model
6 by substituting UG with IW and MC, and both turn out statistically significant at 5%. While
results do not survive the inclusion of country-fixed effects, there is thus some evidence that op-
position campaigns dominated by industrial workers or urban middle classes are related also to
democratic transitions, as measured by BMR.
Still, the associations reported in Table 3 could, potentially, be sensitive to particular model
specification- or measurement choices, or that opposition campaign profile is endogenous to antic-
ipated regime changes. We thus turn to alternative tests.
4.3 Additional tests
Table 6 presents some core robustness tests, and several additional ones are reported in Ap-
pendix C. We employ our main measure of (electoral) democracy, Polyarchy, which ensures sufficient
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variation in the dependent variable. We note at the outset that results for the combined UG dummy
are extremely robust (see Appendix Table C.10). Hence, we mostly focus on tests that employ the
two separate industrial worker and middle class dummies, allowing us to discuss the more nuanced
propositions concerning specific types of opposition campaigns and democratization.
First, results are fairly robust to measuring the dependent variable with a longer lag (e.g., 5
or 10 years) than the baseline 1-year lag. This is exemplified by Model 1, Table 6, which employs
a 2-year lag. Indeed, point estimates increase considerably from the baseline model – from 0.49
to 0.83 for IW and from 0.34 to 0.49 for MC – suggesting that a 1-year lag may be too short to
capture the full effects of urban opposition campaigns on regime change. As in the baseline, IW is
significant at 1%, and MC at 10%.
Second, we note that the weakly significant result for MC comes despite a substantially high
point estimate. Our baseline controls for country- and year-fixed effects, and employs clustered
errors. When combined with the relatively few campaign observations (88 middle class dominated
campaign years), even in our extensive sample, this yields large standard errors. This is illustrated
by Model 2, which employs classical rather than clustered errors. MC is now highly significant
with t = 6.1. More generally, all robustness tests conducted on classical errors yield similarly
strong results. The t-value of IW also increases dramatically, from 2.6 to 8.3. Yet, in the reminder,
we employ the more conservative benchmark approach, clustering on country to, e.g., account for
autocorrelation affecting standard errors.
Third, results in our benchmark could be aﬄicted by post-treatment bias, and we thus tested
models omitting potentially “bad controls”. Controlling for urbanization, in particular, could
arguably wash out parts of the theoretically relevant effect. As discussed, the capacity of industrial
workers, for instance, to bring about democratic change could partly be attributed to workers
living closely together in cities, easing coordination problems (this contrasts sharply with settlement
patterns for peasants). However, more parsimonious models consistently show results similar to the
benchmark. This is exemplified by Model 3, which excludes population, income and urbanization,
where results are virtually identical to the benchmark.
Fourth, the opposite concern is that we are not including all relevant controls, and that results
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are aﬄicted by omitted variable bias. In particular, other aspects of opposition movements (rather
than who participates) may drive democratization. Hence, Model 4 controls also for the estimated
number of people participating in the campaign, from NAVCO (log thousand participants). This
could be an important confounder since the social profile of a campaign could be endogenous to how
many people participate; if the whole population participates, for example, then a majority social
group will by definition dominate. (But, it is also a likely post-treatment variable. The particular
group organizing the campaign will expectedly affect how many people that take part, as suggested
by our argument on social group capacity and, e.g., discussions on strong mobilizing ability of, for
instance, industrial worker unions and labor parties.) Model 4 further includes whether the regime
uses violence against protestors, since particular campaigns might “self-select” into mostly opposing
less violent regimes. Nonetheless, adding these controls does not alter the estimated relationships
between IW/MC and democracy.
Fifth, our baseline measure of urban middle class dominated campaigns does not include cam-
paigns dominated by public sector employees. While counted as “middle class” in many cate-
gorizations schemes, we excluded public employees due to the expectation that they often have
different interests and leverage over regime change, because of their relationship with the state. In
our baseline sample, there number of public employee dominated campaigns is about 1/3 of MC
campaigns (narrowly defined). When employing the more extensive operationalization – counting
public sector employees as urban middle class – the coefficient decreases slightly (from 0.34 to 0.30),
but also becomes more precisely estimated. Indeed, it is now significant at 5%. IW remains highly
significant also in this model.
Sixth, some social groups may self-select into campaigns that are more likely to induce democ-
ratization because they are large-coalition campaigns. Broad coalitions of social groups may have
more leverage, and thus better prospects for forcing the regime to liberalize. Model 6 controls
for number of social groups participating in the campaign. As expected, this variable is positive,
sizeable, and highly significant. While including this count variable weakens MC (0.22; t = 1.2) –
suggesting that urban middle class dominated campaigns, at least in part, are more successful be-
cause they are associated with broader coalitions of social groups – IW remains sizeable (0.43) and
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significant at 5%. However, controlling for class coalitions may very well introduce post-treatment
bias, which is why it is not included in our favored specification: If the capacity to build broad
coalitions is an inherent feature of urban middle class actors, Model 6 underestimates the effect of
MC.
Seventh, we want to ensure that measurement errors in our coding are not driving results. Some
regions and historical periods may be associated with fewer – or conflicting – sources, and Model 5
drops all 92 country-years where our coders have reported low certainty. Results are not changed
by much when doing so, although MC just drops below the p ≤ .10 threshold. In contrast, the
industrial worker results is actually strengthened, but only slightly, suggesting that the benchmark
results do not hinge on cases with uncertain coding.
Eighth, we tested alternative ways of measuring campaign profile. Model 8 changes the inde-
pendent variables from social group dominance to whether movements originated among the given
group(s). MC is substantially strengthened in terms of statistical significance (t = 2.8), whereas
IW now turns insignificant (t = 1.2). However, the IW result is stronger in yet other specifications
altering how the independent variables are constructed: We also run tests on the measures regis-
tering whether a given social group at least participated. These models mostly show strong results,
particularly for industrial workers. In addition, we tested lexical scales (MC Index; IW index).
These are scored as 3 if the given group dominated the movement, 2 if it originated among the
group and the group participated, 1 if the group only participated, and 0 if the group did not have
a recorded presence. These indices provides more nuanced, and arguably more information rich,
measures of the role of the respective social groups in opposition movements, and the related results
are strong for both industrial workers and middle classes. In Model 9, where the IW Index is sig-
nificant at 5% and MC Index at 1%. Hence, prospects for a more democratic regime increase with
how strongly industrial workers and urban middle classes are involved in an opposition movement.
Although controlling for, e.g., income level and time- and country-specific effects should mitigate
many sources of bias, other sources could remain. To further investigate whether there might be
causal effects of the involvement of urban groups in opposition campaigns on democratization,
we estimate instrumental variable models where we endogenize the IW and MC profiles of the
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campaigns. More specifically, we discuss IV models where we endogenize the lexical campaign-
profile indices described above, in order to allow for maximum variance. However, results turn
out to be equally strong for industrial workers and even stronger for the urban middle class when
we employ the “campaign domination” measures from the benchmark as endogenous independent
variables (see Appendix C.13).
As instruments, we use the IW and UW profiles of anti-regime opposition campaigns in the
neighbourhood of country i, calculated by world regions. We expect, for instance, ongoing indus-
trial worker campaigns in other countries in the region to be a strong instrument for industrial
worker campaigns in the country in question. The assumption is that social movements diffuse
across borders and affect the mobilization of similar movements in neighbouring countries, for in-
stance because prospective opposition actors may be motivated by and learn from observing and
communicating with their counterparts in neighboring countries. This is validated in string of stud-
ies on how social movements diffuse through mobilizing similar and (often) allied groups in closely
related countries (see, e.g., Weyland, 2014, 2010, 2009). As expected, the first-stage F-statistics
and t-values of these neighborhood instruments reveal that they are very strong.
To achieve consistent estimates we also need to ensure that neighbourhood campaign profile
is not otherwise linked to democratic change in the country in question. While we do include
all covariates from the benchmark (including country- and year-fixed effects), it may, e.g., be
that neighborhood campaigns affect neighborhood democracy, which in turn affects democracy
domestically. Therefore, in order to further mitigate concerns about the exclusion restrictions we
also condition on a) the neighborhood-profile of other campaign variables in the model, and b)
the neighborhood-profile on democracy. In these specifications, we thus assume that the social
profile of a campaign in the neighborhood – conditional on all the included covariates – only affects
democratic change via the campaign profile in country i.
The instrumental variable (FE 2SLS) results are presented in Table 5. Model 1 shows the second-
stage regression treating the IW index as endogenous. It shows a positive and precisely estimated
(t = 3.6) effect on democratic change. Model 2, showing the first-stage regression, displays the
strength of the industrial worker campaigns in neighborhood instrument, with a t-value of 4.0 and
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Table 5: Instrumental variable models (Fixed Effects 2SLS)
Stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
Dependent variable Polyarchy IW index Polyarchy MC index Polyarchy UG index
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Industrial worker index 0.066*** 0.001 0.247***
(3.64) (0.10) (2.96)
Middle class index -0.002 0.270*** 0.054**
(-0.24) (2.94) (2.42)
Urban groups (combined) index 0.123***
(4.14)
Other campaign -0.043*** 0.416*** -0.056*** 0.891*** -0.158*** 1.302***
(-4.14) (3.25) (-2.63) (7.66) (-3.86) (13.28)
Ln GDP p.c. 0.003 0.010 0.003 0.015 0.002 0.015
(1.12) (0.57) (1.06) (0.78) (0.64) (0.80)
Ln Population 0.001 -0.024 0.000 -0.015 0.004 -0.047*
(0.38) (-0.80) (0.13) (-0.65) (1.23) (-1.95)
Urbanization 0.017 -0.015 0.014 0.041 0.004 0.106
(1.35) (-0.14) (1.34) (0.44) (0.22) (0.96)
Other campaigns in neighb. -0.005 -0.255** -0.002 -0.412*** 0.039*** -0.611***
(-0.38) (-2.00) (-0.21) (-3.81) (2.65) (-4.31)
Democracy in neighborhood 0.050*** 0.143 0.057*** 0.034 0.049** 0.109
(3.23) (1.00) (3.85) (0.30) (2.52) (0.83)
Ind. work. camp. in neighb. 1.116*** 0.076*** -0.337** 0.543**
(4.04) (4.78) (-2.18) (2.37)
Mid. class camp. in neighb. 0.052** -0.349** 0.785*** 0.449**
(2.53) (-2.20) (4.53) (2.61)
Lagged Dependent variable 0.945*** -0.075 0.942*** -0.035 0.952*** -0.106**
(140.51) (-1.43) (137.69) (-0.97) (107.98) (-2.16)
Country dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 9628 9628 9673
Hansen J-test p-value Ex. ident. Ex. ident. .64
Cragg-Donald Wald F-stat. 696.7 377.4 236.6
Instrument(s) IW neighb. UM neighb. IW neighb,UM neighb
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. T-values in parentheses.
Polyarchy in t + 1 is dependent variable. Errors are clustered by country.
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F-values far above conventional heuristics for identifying strong instruments (e.g., Stock and Yogo,
2005). While one can never guarantee that the exclusion restriction holds, Model 1 thus suggests
a clear causal effect of industrial worker campaigns on democratization.
The estimated effect of urban middle class involvement in campaigns is also fairly clear. The
MC index is significant at 5% (t = 2.4) in Model 3, and the point estimate is only slightly lower
than for the MC index in Model 1. Again, the first-stage regression reveals neighborhood (middle
class) campaign profile to be a strong instrument.
Finally, in Models 5–6, we test for an effect of (any type of) urban campaign profile, employing
an index that takes the value 0 if there is no involvement by either industrial workers or the middle
class, 1 if at least one of these (only) participated, 2 if the campaign originated from at least one
of the movements, and 3 if one of them dominated the campaign. We find a sizeable and highly
significant (t = 4.1) coefficient. Since we here include two instruments – measures of both industrial
worker and middle class campaigns in the neighborhood – we can run standard overidenfication
tests. According to the Hansen J-test p-value (.64) the exclusion restriction does not seem to be
violated. This provides fairly strong evidence for the (cruder) hypothesis that the involvement of
urban groups in opposition movements enhances prospects for democratic change.
It is important to note that the IV estimate describes a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE),
interpreted as the effect of campaign profile for those campaigns that “responded” to the instrument,
in the sense that they were predicted by similar campaigns in the regional neighborhood. While
we have no concrete grounds for suspecting this, the LATE(s) estimated in the IV models might
not be generalizable to all campaigns, and is in this sense less externally valid than the non-IV
estimates.
4.4 Is the relationship between urban opposition movements and democratiza-
tion sensitive to contextual factors?
Before concluding, we briefly discuss whether results are sensitive to the time period under
study, geographic region, and whether societies are urbanized or not. These tests may be viewed
as “robustness tests”, but, as we will clarify, we consider at least some of them rather as tests of
additional implications from our argument. Since we are limiting degrees of freedom by considering
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particular contexts, we mostly focus on the “combined” UG dummy: when investigating particular
time periods or omitting key regions, the number of campaigns dominated by one group can become
quite low (but see Appendix Table C.14 for tests on IW and MC separately). The models below
are similar to our benchmark, with, e.g., country- and year-fixed effects and errors clustered by
country.
We start out by investigating whether the relationship between urban campaigns and democ-
ratization is sensitive to time period under study. Admittedly, given the fairly general nature of
our argument, we should be concerned if we only identify the relationship in some parts of recent
modern history. But, as argued above, most countries globally (with the exception of some Western
countries) have mainly observed processes of industrialization and, particularly, urbanization after
mid-20th century. Hence, the capacities and motivations of urban actors to pursue democratization
may have increased. When splitting the 1900–2010 time-period in two, we find that UG is 0.060
when estimated on post-1955 data (Model 2) and 0.017 on pre-1956 data (Model 1). Still, also
the latter result is (weakly) significant, despite including only 2728 country-year observations and
34 observations of campaigns dominated by urban groups. This dovetails nicely also with previ-
ous case-study evidence for urban middle class or industrial worker movements in democratization
coming from both historical and more contemporary cases (see, e.g., Collier, 1999).
We would also be concerned if our results are basically stemming from developments in one
particular geographic region. However, we did not expect this: Although many early studies
on urban groups and democratic transitions focused on Europe or Latin America, several recent
studies on third-wave democratization experiences have considered countries from different regions,
including Eastern Europe (McFaul, 2002) and Sub-Saharan Africa (Bratton and van de Walle,
1997). Even more recently, the urban middle-class composition of the movement orchestrating the
Tunisian revolution in 2009 is one proposed reason why this revolution induced democratization,
while other Arab Spring revolutions culminated in new autocracies (Beissinger, Jamal and Mazur,
2015). Models 3–8 reveal that the relationship is fairly stable and always significant at 1% when
omitting any major region. UG is lowest when omitting Eastern Europe (.038; Model 4; benchmark
estimate is .047) and highest when omitting Asia-Pacific (.063; Model 8).
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Finally, we turn to regressions that should rather be viewed as additional tests of our argument:
We expected that industrial workers and urban middle class actors have clearer motivation and
stronger capacity to induce democratization in more urban societies. This is also what we find:
Models 9 (relatively rural) and 10 (urban) split the sample according to median level of urbanization
(0.41). Model 10 reveals a highly significant coefficient almost four times the size of the coefficient
in Model 9. However, UG is still fairly sizeable (.021) and the p-value is .051 even in Model 9.
To further probe the theorized interaction, we added multiplicative terms (urbanization multi-
plied with, respectively, urban and other campaigns) to the benchmark. This model (11) predicts
that the expected interaction is sizeable, although not very precisely estimated (t = 1.9). The point
estimates actually suggest a negative (but insignificant) relationship between urban groups and de-
mocratization when less than about 10 percent of the population lives in cities. Model 12 nuances
this result by once again separating industrial worker from middle class campaigns. The estimated
interaction term is both larger in size (.16 vs .09) and t-value (1.7 vs 0.6) for IW than for MC.
While we note that these interaction terms are not clearly distinguishable from each other, this
(mildly) suggests that the overall relationship observed in Model 11 is largely driven by industrial
workers becoming increasingly effective agents of democratization as urbanization proceeds.
5 Conclusion
A prominent view – linking socio-economic development to democratization – is that urbaniza-
tion and industrialization empowers industrial workers and/or the urban middle classes, and that
these groups, in turn, often act as agents of democratization. In this paper, we have elaborated
on why these groups may be motivated to pursue democratization, particularly in urban societies,
and explaining why they should have the required capacity to (sometimes) succeed. Importantly,
we also shed new empirical light on this fascinating issue – which has predominantly either been
scrutinized in historical accounts of selected cases or by regression models employing distal proxies
of social group motivation and/or capacity, such as GDP per capita. To this end, we collected
data on the social groups partaking in organized opposition campaigns throughout the world from
1900–2012.
Our main findings can be quickly summarized as follows: Social movements dominated by these
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urban groups are clearly linked to democratization,. This goes both when we compare to oppo-
sition movements dominated by other groups, such as peasants or religious or ethnic groups, and
to situations where no organized opposition movement exists. The result finds support in different
contexts, but the relationship seems stronger in more recent decades and in urbanized societies. Fur-
ther, when making the distinction between opposition movements dominated by the urban middle
classes and by industrial workers, we find evidence that both are associated with democratization.
However, results are much more robust for the democratizing role of industrial worker movements.
This result corroborates the accounts presented by scholars such as Rueschemeyer, Stephens and
Stephens (1992) and Collier (1999).
Our findings inform different, though partly overlapping, literatures. First, we present a novel
empirical take on the social origins of democratic revolutions, thus contributing to long-standing
debates in comparative-historical political sociology (Moore, 1966; Skocpol, 1979; Rueschemeyer,
Stephens and Stephens, 1992; Luebbert, 1991; Tilly, 1996). Second, our analysis significantly
informs the recent literature on the origins of dictatorship and democracy in general (Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003; Teorell, 2010; Ansell and Samuels, 2014), which is, at least in
part, motivated by the aforementioned comparative-historical literature. Finally, we expand on the
recent large-n literature on opposition movements, starting with Chenoweth and Stephan (2011),
by linking the outcomes of these movements to their social composition.
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A Codebook for indicators of protest movements social composi-
tion
Below is the codebook for the variables recording the social background of participants in
protest campaigns. For each campaign, we always consulted several different sources, including both
databases and encyclopedias such as “The international encyclopedia of revolution and protest”
(Ness, 2015) and the “Global Non-Violent Action Database” (Swarthmore, 2015), partly on various
reports by international or non-governmental organizations such as UNHCR or Freedom House,
were the relevant events were described, and partly on books and journal articles that cover the
campaigns, such as e.g. Ackerman and DuVall (2001) and Nepstad (2011). We coded each campaign
based on the participants that were reported to have been a part of the campaign from the start
year listed in NAVCO 1.0, to the end year.
As noted in the paper, the sources are usually relatively clear as to whether members of different
social groups participated in movements at all, as there is usually some kind of description of the
protest participants. Likewise, there is usually some description of where and amongst who the
campaign originated. When it comes to the variable recording whether each social group dominated
the campaign, we relied on a coding rule requiring that the movement should at least either have
that social group as majority of its members, or, if not, they should have had a critical impact on
the strategies and outcomes of the campaign.
The coding scheme distinguished between the following social groups:
• Peasants, refering to both farmers and rural workers.
• Industrial workers, refering to labor employed in the industrial sector.
• Public sector employees, refering to employees in the public sector such as bureacrats and
teachers
• Other urban middle classes, referring to all urban groups other than public sector em-
ployees, including business elites, smaller merchants, professionals (including e.g. lawyers,
doctors etc) and university professors.
• Military employees, refering to military officers, soldiers as well as veterans
• Members of religious or ethnic groups
Most of these groups are mutually exclusive, expect from religious or ethnic groups, that can
overlap with the other social groups.
The details coding roles for each indicator, that was coded separately for each social group, are
described below:
1. Participated in the campaign
These variables record whether a social group is mentioned in the sources as having partic-
ipated in the campaign at some point in time. As noted, we always consult several sources
to determine the profile of each campaign. To get assigned the value “1”, at least 2 sources
should mention that thesocial participated in the campaign. To get assigned the value “0”,
at 4-5 sources should not mention these groups as having participated in the campaign, to
ensure that the no-mentioning is not simply a missing data or poor data quality problem.
i
Campaigns were also coded as 0 if at least 2 sources described the campaign as consisting
exclusively of other groups, such as peasants or workers.
• 0: The social group was not reported to have participated in the campaign
• 1: The social group, at a minimum, is reported to have participated in the campaign at
some point in time
2. Dominated the campaigns
These variables record whether the campaign was dominated by each social group. The
dominance criteria should be considered fulfilled if the campaign is in line with at least one of
the following criterias: 1) The relevant social group made up a majority of campaign members
or 2) The relevant social group had a critical impact on the outcome and/or the strategies of
the campaign. To be considered to be in majority, the sources should mention this explicitly,
for instance through formulations such as “most of the protesters were peasants”. Conversely,
if sources mention explicitly that other social groups were in majority, the majority criteria is
considered as not being fulfilled. The “critical impact“ criteria is more reliant on subjective
judgment. It should be considered fulfilled if the sources describe the relevant social group
as having been the most important force behind the strategies and/or the outcome of the
movement.
• 0: The campaign was not dominated by the social group
• 1: The campaign was dominated by the social group
3. Initiated the campaign
These variables record whether the campaign originated among or was initiated by the relevant
social group. To code this variable, the year that is listed as “start year” in NAVCO is
considered as the campaign’s starting point. Hence, events taking place before this starting
point are excluded from the consideration. If the movement originated among several groups,
each group can be considered as having initiated the campaign although other groups also
helped to initiate it. Hence, if the movement was described as originating among, e.g.,
peasants as well as other groups, the campaign will still be assigned a “1” on the initiation
by peasants variable.
• 0: The campaign did not originate among the social group
• 1: The campaign originated among the social group
ii
B Descriptive statistics
Table B.1: Summary statistics for key variables (Restricted to the 9738 observations in the baseline
model)
(1)
count mean sd min max
Electoral democracy index 9738 .3988276 .2856613 .0092174 .9559249
Democracy (BMR) 8240 .4302184 .4951366 0 1
Middle class OR ind. workers dominated 9738 .0141713 .1182028 0 1
Middle class dominated 9738 .0088314 .0935644 0 1
Industrial workers dominated 9738 .0081125 .0897082 0 1
Middle class origin 9721 .0120358 .1090512 0 1
Industrial worker origin 9729 .0062699 .0789382 0 1
Middle class participated 9646 .0462368 .2100084 0 1
Industrial workers participated 9692 .0338423 .1808326 0 1
Public sector workers dominated 9737 .0029783 .0544955 0 1
Religious or ethnic group dominated 9733 .0322614 .1767025 0 1
Peasants dominated 9732 .0256885 .1582123 0 1
Public sector workers origin 9733 .0025686 .0506186 0 1
Religious or ethnic group origin 9695 .0292935 .1686365 0 1
Peasants origin 9695 .0096957 .0979934 0 1
Peasants participated 9718 .0595802 .2367195 0 1
Public sector workers participated 9685 .0279814 .1649281 0 1
Religious or ethnic group participated 9689 .0477861 .2133245 0 1
Other campaign 9738 .0734237 .2608441 0 1
lmembers 9738 2.815054 11.6175 0 68
regviol 9738 .0664407 .2490637 0 1
Ln GDP p.c. 9738 7.845352 1.031364 5.315224 10.66701
Ln Population 9738 15.89295 1.556347 10.12663 21.00888
Urbanization 9738 .4302695 .2296751 .0134997 .97432
Industrial worker index 9683 .0465765 .2885249 0 3
Middle class index 9629 .0647004 .3312883 0 3
Middle class dominated campaigns in neighborhood 9738 .063606 .1071837 0 1.636364
Ind. worker dominated campaigns in neighborhood 9738 .0427623 .0921789 0 1.454545
Campaigns in neighborhood 9738 .0949367 .1064943 0 .8181818
Democracy score in neighborhood 9738 .3883268 .2198609 .0325952 .8979004
Observations 9738
iii
C Additional robustness tests and extensions
This Appendix contains various other robustness tests and extensions noted in the main text,
but not reported there in Tables.
The sequence of tests is as follows: Table C.1 shows campaign level regressions on democra-
tization reflecting the situation five years – rather than the baseline one year – after the relevant
campaign ended. Table C.2 displays logit versions of the (campaign-level) baseline OLS regressions
when the dichotomous BMR measure is used as dependent variable.
Moving to the robustness tests on the country-year regressions, Tables C.3–C.5 displays regres-
sions using changes (either all changes, only positive, or only negative) in the Polyarchy measure as
the dependent variable, and these tables contains specifications controlling for and not controlling
for the initial level of Polyarchy. Tables C.6–C.7 displays various regressions investigating Polyarchy
changes with countries defined as minimum democracies and autocracies, according to BMR, and
including and excluding instances of democratization (as coded using BMR). This allows for show-
ing how campaigns dominated by urban groups can affect gradual changes in level of democracy,
also when not pushing a regime across the threshold for being coded as a minimalist democracy.
Table C.10 provides a large set of additional robustness tests when considering the measure on
whether campaigns were dominated by either one of the two urban groups (industrial workers or
urban middle classes) under focus. Table C.11 replicates the robustness test table (Table 4) in
the paper, but now using positive changes in Polyarchy (“democratic upturns”) as the dependent
variable.
Further, Table C.12 nuances the core findings in one particular respect: These are the core
country-year regressions using Polyarchy as dependent variable from Table 3, but now providing a
more detailed categorization of campaigns dominated by other groups than the two urban groups
under focus. The results from this table suggests that campaigns dominated by peasants are
particularly “bad” for democracy.
Table C.13 replicates the second stages of the 2SLS regressions from Table 5, but now using the
“campaign domination” dummies rather than the more fine grained lexical indices as endogenous
regressors. Finally, Table C.14 reproduces the split sample tests reported in Table 6 of the paper,
but this time differentiating between industrial workers and urban middle classes rather than using
the combined variable for whether one of these “urban groups” dominate the campaign.
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Table C.1: Campaign-level (cross sectional) correlates of democratization, measuring democratic
transition with longer time horizon. That is, going from 0 on BMR at campaign start to 1 five
years after campaign ended
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Democratic transition.
Ind. workers or mid. class dominate 0.267*** 0.145*
(3.41) (1.70)
Industrial workers dominate 0.267*** 0.160
(2.76) (1.59)
Middle class dominate 0.257*** 0.205**
(2.84) (2.18)
Ln campaign participants 0.000 0.001
(0.07) (0.33)
Urbanization 0.208 0.202
(0.66) (0.66)
Ln population -0.022 -0.021
(-0.80) (-0.79)
Ln GDP per capita 0.189** 0.179**
(2.60) (2.51)
Constant 0.187*** -0.874 0.170*** -0.845
(4.27) (-1.44) (4.09) (-1.43)
N 140 122 139 121
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. T-values in parentheses.
OLS regressions with campaign as cross-section unit.
Only campaigns initiated in BMR autocracies included in sample.
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Table C.2: Campaign-level correlates of democratization as measured by change from 0 to 1 in
BMR. Logit models
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable Dem. trans. measured 1 year after campaign end Dem. trans. measured 5 years after campaign end
IW or MC dominate 1.092** 0.687 1.284*** 0.704
(2.48) (1.34) (3.21) (1.48)
Ind. workers dom. 1.128** 0.827 1.248** 0.782
(2.20) (1.47) (2.54) (1.40)
Mid. class domi. 0.679 0.529 1.225*** 1.065*
(1.35) (0.94) (2.65) (1.94)
Ln camp. particip. 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002
(0.05) (0.14) (-0.09) (0.22)
Urbanization 3.233* 3.327* 1.013 1.065
(1.70) (1.72) (0.54) (0.55)
Ln population -0.081 -0.064 -0.147 -0.142
(-0.44) (-0.34) (-0.87) (-0.82)
Ln GDP per capita 0.323 0.288 1.037** 1.014**
(0.73) (0.65) (2.31) (2.23)
Constant -1.854*** -4.085 -1.871*** -4.238 -1.466*** -6.899* -1.570*** -7.082*
(-6.22) (-1.07) (-6.51) (-1.11) (-5.61) (-1.93) (-6.03) (-1.94)
N 140 122 139 121 140 122 139 121
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. T-values in parentheses.
Logit regressions with campaign as cross-section unit.
Only campaigns initiated in BMR autocracies included in sample.
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Table C.3: Core cross-section time series models, with change (from t to t + 1) in Polyarchy as
dependent variable
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimator FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS
Middle class OR ind. workers dominate 0.051*** 0.047***
(4.13) (3.98)
Industrial workers dominate 0.054*** 0.049**
(2.68) (2.55)
Middle class dominate 0.036* 0.034*
(1.85) (1.86)
Other campaign -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(-0.34) (-0.45) (-0.58) (-0.73)
Ln GDP p.c. -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002
(-0.32) (-0.40) (0.78) (0.74)
Ln Population 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.03) (0.04) (-0.24) (-0.23)
Urbanization 0.014* 0.014* 0.022** 0.022**
(1.79) (1.76) (2.14) (2.16)
Polyarchy (level in t) -0.052*** -0.052***
(-9.12) (-9.27)
Country dummies Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
N 9739 9738 9739 9739
Countries 147 147 147 147
Max time series 1900–2010 1900–2010 1900–2010 1900–2010
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. T-values in parentheses.
Except for in Model 3, errors are clustered by country.
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Table C.4: Core cross-section time series models, with “upturns”/positive change (from t to t+ 1)
in Polyarchy as dependent variable (democratic downturns coded as 0 change)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimator FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS
Middle class OR ind. workers dominated 0.049*** 0.046***
(4.40) (4.23)
Industrial workers dominate 0.048*** 0.044**
(2.68) (2.59)
Middle class dominate 0.037** 0.036**
(2.22) (2.22)
Other campaign 0.007** 0.007** 0.006** 0.006**
(2.44) (2.33) (2.25) (2.12)
Ln GDP p.c. -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001
(-1.10) (-1.16) (-0.28) (-0.33)
Ln Population 0.004* 0.004* 0.003 0.003
(1.93) (1.86) (1.35) (1.32)
Urbanization 0.015 0.015 0.021* 0.021**
(1.60) (1.60) (1.98) (2.00)
Polyarchy (level in t) -0.037*** -0.037***
(-7.25) (-7.37)
Country dummies Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
N 9739 9738 9739 9738
Countries 147 147 147 147
Max time series 1900–2010 1900–2010 1900–2010 1900–2010
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. T-values in parentheses.
Except for in Model 3, errors are clustered by country.
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Table C.5: Core cross-section time series models, with “downturns/negative change (from t to t+1)
in Polyarchy as dependent variable (democratic upturns coded as 0 change
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimator FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS
Middle class OR ind. workers dominated 0.002 0.001
(0.48) (0.18)
Industrial workers dominated 0.006* 0.004
(1.82) (1.45)
Middle class dominated -0.001 -0.001
(-0.18) (-0.27)
Other campaign -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009***
(-3.51) (-3.72) (-3.70) (-3.93)
Ln GDP p.c. 0.002 0.002 0.003** 0.003**
(1.59) (1.55) (2.33) (2.29)
Ln Population -0.004** -0.003** -0.004*** -0.004***
(-2.60) (-2.56) (-2.79) (-2.75)
Urbanization -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001
(-0.20) (-0.23) (0.25) (0.22)
Polyarchy (level in t) -0.015*** -0.015***
(-5.55) (-5.48)
Country dummies Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
N 9739 9738 9739 9738
Countries 147 147 147 147
Max time series 1900–2010 1900–2010 1900–2010 1900–2010
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. T-values in parentheses.
Except for in Model 3, errors are clustered by country.
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Table C.6: Excluding all democracies (and excluding democratization years)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
m1 m2 m3 m4
Middle class or industrial workers dominated 0.0685 0.0687 0.0307* 0.0307*
(1.51) (1.50) (2.03) (2.03)
Other campaign -0.0205* -0.0223 -0.0188** -0.0188**
(-1.98) (-1.73) (-2.71) (-2.71)
Polyarchy (level in t) 0.871*** 0.816*** 0.624*** 0.624***
(64.32) (37.84) (54.55) (54.55)
Ln GDP p.c. 0.0132** 0.00400 0.00400
(3.30) (0.63) (0.63)
Ln population 0.000983 -0.00717 -0.00717
(0.48) (-0.90) (-0.90)
Urbanization 0.0368 0.141*** 0.141***
(1.85) (5.17) (5.17)
country dummies Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
N 3732 3528 3528 3528
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Notes: These models exclude all democracies and instances of democratization (as captured using the BMR democracy
measure). This means that these models only look at liberalization short of full-blown democratiztion, in dictatorships.
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Table C.7: Excluding all democracies (and including democratization years)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS
Middle class OR ind. workers dominated 0.0735∗∗∗ 0.0740∗∗∗ 0.0768∗∗∗ 0.0603∗∗∗
(3.62) (3.62) (9.50) (7.57)
Other campaign 0.000941 -0.00171 -0.00494 -0.00672
(0.22) (-0.36) (-1.12) (-1.55)
Polyarchy (level in t) 0.872∗∗∗ 0.864∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗
(44.79) (37.74) (58.34) (50.66)
Ln GDP p.c. -0.00506 -0.00510 0.0176∗∗∗
(-1.57) (-1.48) (4.54)
Ln Population -0.000654 0.0337∗∗∗ 0.0133
(-0.61) (6.91) (1.83)
Urbanization 0.0284∗ 0.00688 -0.0117
(2.23) (0.34) (-0.52)
country dummies Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
N 5975 4670 4670 4670
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: These models exclude all democracies but include instances of democratization
(as captured using the BMR democracy measure). This means that these models only
look at instances of partial and full-blown democratization in states that are autocratic.
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Table C.8: Excluding all dictatorships (and including democratization years)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
m1 m2 m3 m4
Middle class or industrial workers dominated 0.0685 0.0687 0.0307* 0.0307*
(1.51) (1.50) (2.03) (2.03)
Other campaign -0.0205* -0.0223 -0.0188** -0.0188**
(-1.98) (-1.73) (-2.71) (-2.71)
Polyarchy (level in t) 0.871*** 0.816*** 0.624*** 0.624***
(64.32) (37.84) (54.55) (54.55)
Ln GDP p.c. 0.0132** 0.00400 0.00400
(3.30) (0.63) (0.63)
Ln population 0.000983 -0.00717 -0.00717
(0.48) (-0.90) (-0.90)
Urbanization 0.0368 0.141*** 0.141***
(1.85) (5.17) (5.17)
country dummies Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
N 3732 3528 3528 3528
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Notes: These models exclude all dictatorships but includes instances of democratization. This
means that these models look at incremental democratization in states that are already demo-
cratic according to the BMR threshold and full on democratization from dictatorship to democracy.
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Table C.9: Excluding all dictatorships (and excluding democratization years)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS
Middle class OR ind. workers dominated -0.0289 -0.0263 -0.0287 -0.0287
(-1.16) (-0.91) (-1.76) (-1.76)
Other campaign -0.0177* -0.0179* -0.0148* -0.0148*
(-2.40) (-2.27) (-2.33) (-2.33)
Polyarchy (level in t) 0.932*** 0.900*** 0.782*** 0.782***
(84.03) (60.47) (69.72) (69.72)
Ln GDP p.c. 0.00732** -0.000834 -0.000834
(3.18) (-0.15) (-0.15)
Ln Population 0.000628 -0.0107 -0.0107
(0.48) (-1.53) (-1.53)
Urbanization 0.0225* 0.0994*** 0.0994***
(2.13) (4.13) (4.13)
country dummies Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
N 3594 3405 3405 3405
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Notes: These models exclude all dictatorships and instances of democratization. This means that these models
only look at incremental democratization in states that are already democratic according to the BMR threshold.
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Table C.12: Core cross-section time series models, further nuancing “Other campaigns”
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimator FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS
Dependent variable V-Dem Polyarchy ∆ Polyarchy Upturns Polyarchy
Middle class OR ind. workers dominate 0.046***
(3.78)
Industrial workers dominate 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.045***
(3.02) (3.02) (3.00)
Middle class dominate 0.034* 0.034* 0.033**
(1.83) (1.83) (2.03)
Public employees dominate 0.023 0.020 0.020 0.019
(0.70) (0.63) (0.63) (0.69)
Regious or ethnic groups dominate -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.011*
(-0.35) (-0.26) (-0.26) (-1.71)
Peasants dominate -0.025** -0.024** -0.024** -0.029***
(-2.36) (-2.27) (-2.27) (-3.52)
Existence of any campaign 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.020***
(0.87) (0.69) (0.69) (3.26)
Lagged Polyarchy 0.948*** 0.949*** -0.051*** -0.036***
(165.21) (168.59) (-9.13) (-7.32)
Ln GDP p.c. 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.000
(0.96) (0.92) (0.92) (-0.19)
Ln Population -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.004
(-0.04) (-0.00) (-0.00) (1.54)
Urbanization 0.021* 0.020* 0.020* 0.019*
(1.94) (1.94) (1.94) (1.84)
Country dummies Y Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y Y
N 9726 9726 9726 9726
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. T-values in parentheses.
Except for in Model 3, errors are clustered by country.
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Table C.13: Instrumental variable second-stage regression (Fixed Effects 2SLS), with industrial
worker- and/or urban middle class campaign domination variables (rather than lexical indices) as
endogenous independent variables
Endogenous independent variable Ind. work. dominate Mid. cl. dominate IW or MC dominate
Model (1) (2) (3)
Industrial workers dominate 0.212*** 0.007
(3.12) (0.30)
Middle class dominate -0.008 0.149**
(-0.36) (2.47)
Middle class OR ind. workers dominated 0.257***
(5.30)
Other campaign -0.021*** -0.018** -0.054***
(-3.00) (-2.25) (-3.61)
Lagged Polyarchy 0.946*** 0.942*** 0.951***
(136.37) (133.14) (115.23)
Ln GDP p.c. 0.003 0.003 0.002
(1.10) (1.15) (0.65)
Ln Population 0.002 0.000 0.005
(0.93) (0.14) (1.58)
Urbanization 0.014 0.017 0.012
(1.06) (1.61) (0.83)
Middle class dominated campaigns in neighborhood 0.054***
(2.67)
Ind. worker dominated campaigns in neighborhood 0.077***
(4.95)
Campaigns in neighborhood -0.003 -0.003 0.035***
(-0.28) (-0.26) (2.58)
Democracy score in neighborhood 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.046**
(3.36) (3.47) (2.29)
Country dummies Y Y Y
Year dummies Y Y Y
N 9739 9738 9739
Hansen J-test p-value Ex. ident. Ex. ident. .92
Cragg-Donald Wald F-stat. 527.8 294.7 270.7
Instrument(s) IW neighb. UM neighb. IW neighb,UM neighb
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. T-values in parentheses.
Polyarchy in t + 1 is dependent variable. Errors are clustered by country.
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Le LIEPP (Laboratoire interdisciplinaire d'évaluation des politiques 
publiques) est un laboratoire d'excellence (Labex). 
Ce projet est distingué par le jury scientifique international désigné 
par l'Agence nationale de la recherche (ANR).  
Il est financé dans le cadre des investissements d'avenir. 
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